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0 Dispute Settlement: Genera 
Appreciation and the Role of' India 
On I January 1995, the Understandilzg on Rules and 
Procedures Goverrzing the SettEement of Disputes (LISU) 
entered into force. Until August 2006, the DSU has since 
been applied to 348 compkints - more cases than dispute 
settlemerzt under the GATT 1947 had dealt. with in nearly 
five decades. The system is perceived, both by 
practibioners and in academic literamre, to work generally 
well. However, it has also revealed some Jaws. 
Negotiations to review and reform the DSU have been 
taking place since 1997 f "DSU review"), however, 
without yieEding any result so far. Zn the meantime, WTO 
Members and adjudicating bodies managed to develop the 
system furttzer t h r o w  evolvitzg gractice. While this 
approach may remedy some prcrctical shortcomings of tlze 
DSU text, the more profound imbalance betw een rela~vely 
efficient judicial decision-mking in the W ( ~ s  
incorporated in the DSU) and near& blocked political 
decision-making evolves into a serir7ms challenge to llze 
sustainabilig of the system. - - -- 
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W O  AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
$dtis nrdiGke provides an overview of the firit eleven years 
uf LES'U pmcdice aad fhe current DS U review nego~ations. 
Atz sutksok f~ar fatilere chaUe~ages to the system is also 
given. itdoreover, veeg ic  secGons of the aPticle focus sn 
the sole of iPZ WTO dispute seglement, her use o f  
Ihe system and her ylarbkrbkc@alZofi ila Ihe DSU review 
aego~atk'ons. 
1. Introduction 
Trade agreements on the basis of reciprocity are instruments used by 
governments to achieve trade liberalisation. The reciprocal exchange of market 
access rights which occurs through such agreements amounts to an international 
exchange of domestic political support between governments that helps 
policymakers to overcome the protectionist bias of uncoordinated trade policies. 
in order to protect the negotiated balance of rights and obligations from eroding - 
e.g., by trade restrictions which one government may introduce in violation of the 
trade agreement in order to enhance its political support from import-competing 
interests - trade agreements usually include dispute settlement mechanisms 
based on diplomatic and/or adiudicative procedures. 
Such a dispute settlement mechanism is  also included in the multilateral 
trading system. Based on the rudimentary provisions of two articles in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947, i.e., Article XXll on 
Consultations and Article XXlll on Nullification or Impairment of Benefits, dispute 
seitlement developed gradually through evolving practice and occasional 
codifications thereof. With the exception of an anti-legalist phase in the ' 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  
the trend went from an initially rather diplomacy-oriented mechanism towards a 
more adjudication-oriented one. 
The conclusion af the Uruguay Round of Multilclteral Trade Negotiations 
brought the establishment of the Wsrld Tmde Organisation (WO) on 1 January 
1995,. According to Article 181.3 of the W0 Agreement, dispute settlement is one 
of the key functiows QC the W O ,  The rules of the mechanism are laid down in 
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detail in the Understanding on Rufes and Procedures Governing ithe Settlement of 
Disputes fin short: Dispute Settlement Understanding; DSU) in Annex 2 of the 
W O  Agreement. The DSU has both incorporated the inherited concept of GAIT 
dispute settlement, and it has codified the practices that had evolved previously 
into a consolidated text. in addition, it has brought important innovations (see 
below). 
The mechanism has been used actively by Members in the first ten years of its 
existence. At the same time, it has been a topic of much academic interest and 
debate. Moreover, Members have been involved in negotiations to review and 
reform the mechanism since late 1997, however, without coming to an 
agreement so far. 
This article gives an overview of the W O  dispute settlement mechanism 
eleven years after it became operational. Chapter 2 briefly presents the structure 
of the mechanism. Chapter 3 includes basic data on the use of the system 
between 1995 and 2005 and its perception in academic literature. Specific 
paragraphs focus on the experience of lndia in the system. Chapter 4 deals with 
efforts of Members to further develop the DSU in the DSU review negotiations. 
Again, specific attention is given to the role of India in this exercise. Chapter 5 
concludes and attempts to give an outlook on the challenges that await the DSU 
in the coming years. 
2. The Dispute Settlement Procedure in the DSU' 
In W O  dispute settlement, private economic actors such as consumers, 
producers, importers and exporters cannot bring complaints directly. Nor does 
the WTO by itself initiate legal cases against its Members, even if their trade 
measures obviously violate multilateral trade law. In W O  dispute settlement, 
complaints may exclusively be brought by (and against) governments. Whether 
or not a government will make use of the system in order to tackle a trade issue 
that is raised by a private economic actor is $herefore a matter OS national pdicy, 
law, and procedure, Some eeun!ries have established nsrms  for this decision 
WTO AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
process (such as the United States with "Section 301" or the European Union with 
the "Trade Barriers Regulation").2 In many countries, however, there is no 
pu blicly-known decision process. 
In short, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding provides for a procedure 
that starts with mandatory consultations as a diplomatic element. If the disputing 
governments cannot agree to a settlement during these consultations within a 
certain period, or if the defending party does not respond to the consultations 
request, the complainant may request a panel to review the matter. Panels are 
composed ad  hoc and they consist of normally three specialists who engage in 
fact-finding and apply the relevant W O  provisions to the dispute at hand. Their 
findings and recommendations are published in a report against which either or 
both parties may appeal. Unless there is an appeal, the reports are adopted in a 
quasi-automatic adoption procedure by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)3 
where all WTO Members are represented. "Quasi-automatic" adoption means 
that the reports are adopted unless the DSB decides by consensus (i.e., including 
the party that has prevailed) not to adopt the report. 
In case of an appeal, however, the Appellate Body reviews the issues of law 
and legal interpretations in the panel report that are subiect to the appeal. The 
Appellate Body is a standing body composed of seven jurists, three of whom (i.e., 
a division) work on each case. The Appellate Body can uphold, modify or reverse 
the panel's findings. After this appellate review, no further recourse is possible. 
The DSB shall then adopt the report in the quasi-automatic adoption procedure 
described above. 
If it has been found that a trade measure is in violation of WTO law, the 
defendant shall bring the measure into compliance with the covered agreements 
within a reasonable period of time, normally not exceeding 9 5 months. If the 
defendant refuses to comply, the complainant may ask the defendant to enter 
inSo negotiations on compensation, or may seek authorisation from the BSB 4.0 
Suspend Concesions or Other Obligations j S ( 3 0 0 )  vis-c4-vis the defendant at an 
amount equivalent to the injury sufiered, If the adequacy of implementation is 
disputed, the implementation measures are subject to further review under the 
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DSU. The suspension of concessions or other obligations, if authorised, normally 
takes the form of punitive tariffs on a defined value of the complainant's imports 
from the defendant. The structure of the dispute settlement mechanism (key 
elements only) is summarised in Graph 1. 
Graph 1: Simplified Ovenriew of the Dispute Sealerrpent 
Procedure under the DSU 
3 r--*.--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I Katioual fniliali sation proceduisca 
L. - - - --- .-- - . .-----.--.--.------------------------ _- . i 
i 
Implerneutn tiom Car~~plni~rant nrcepfs 
d'ot,tp/a7nivtnnf y u ~ ~  fi011.s coiiij)limcc~ -------- ---- - --* rn?y/oulenbnfzon: sefljcrirc?~~ 
I Compliauce panel procedure Defe~~dovif i~jbrtnd ro be rtr 
Cor,tpiorrrorrt wzns 1 * cor/tp/iance. .s~ttl@tnenf 
, 
Compensation I Suspensioii of concessions or 
other obligatlous 1 ,, Tempor at?." sc.rf/ea?@n~ 
The DSU as of today represents a codified procedure that combines elements 
of both political negotiation and adiudication. In the current mechanism, the 
politicat, negotiation-oriented elements include, inter alia, mandatory confidential 
eonsdtations, tactical elements during the panel stage (establishment of panels 
only at second meeting where the panel request appears on the DSB agenda, 
possibility to suspend the panel procedures upon complainant3 request, interim 
review), and the subordination of the entire procedure to a "political" body, as 
the competence to adopt panel and Appellate Body reporfs rests with the Dispute 
SeHIesrrent Body, Finally, the nature of the ultimate countermeasures, I.ev the 
Suspension of Concessions or Ohher Obligations ( S C 0 0 )  in the case of nsn- 
Bmplemen~aiion of recommendations, is  negotiation-orienled and exciusively 
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based on the political concept of reciprocity, as it can hardly be regarded as 
supportive of the security and predictability of a rule-oriented multilateral trading 
system. The Special and Differential treatment (S&D) of developing countries 
under the DSU is  also a political feature. 
Rule-oriented elements include, inter alia, the conformity and notification 
requirements with regard to mutually agreed solutions; the right to a panel (more 
generally: the removal of btocking possibilities in the process); the appellate 
review stage; and the prohibition of unauthorised, unilateral retaliatory action. 
These elements seek to secure the conformity of trade policy measures and 
dispute outcomes with the relevant provisions of W6 law. Other features of the 
system such as third party rights also support rule-orientation. 
Given the stage-specific approach to WTO dispute settlement (which provides 
for gradual escalation) and the fact that trade violations do not trigger automatic 
prosecution, we may furthermore establish the hypothesis that only a fraction of 
all protectionist measures will ever be tackled under the WTO dispute settlement 
system. We could use the picture of an iceberg: Trade measures in areas that are 
not governed by strict WTO disciplines or that do not seem politically opportune 
to tackle, may indeed never be raised before the WTO visibly. Discussions on 
such measures - if they take place at all - may be confined to informal settings 
of bilateral meetings or fora below the multilateral level, e.g., bilateral economic 
commissions, mixed committees of preferential trade agreements (or their 
subcommittees) and so forth. From the perspective of the WO, all these 
protectionist measures remain "under the water". 
Of those cases that are raised officially through the notification of 
consultations to the WTO, a considerable proportion is settled during the rather 
informal consuftation stage, meaning that the actual outcome of the discussions 
remains often unknown or unclear ("foggy area"). Therefore, those cases actually 
leading to panel ar Appellate Body reports with clear findings of violations may 
iherefore be considered to represent just the tip of the iceberg (see Graph 2). 
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3. Experiences with the VJTO Dispute Settlement System 
3.1 General Use of the Procedure 
Between 1 January 1995 and 31 August 2006, 348 consultation requests were 
notified to the WT0.4 Compared to the less than 300 cases submitted to GATT 
dispute settlement in 47 years, this number already shows that the new system 
has been quite popular among Members so far. However, these numbers should 
not be over-interpreted: The old GATT had less Members, and it covered fewer 
agreements and sectors of economic activiv than the WO.  
Graph 3 shows the intensity in the use of the dispute sel-tiement mechanism in 
its first eleven years, i.e., until 31 December 2005. The number of complaints 
increased shorply in the first three years after the mechanim had come into 
force, and it peaked in 1997 with 50 new consultation requests in one single 
year. Thereafter, the number of consultation requests dropped .to an annual 
average of 30 complaints in the period from 2000 to 2003, and further to only 
1 %  new complaints in 2005, the lowest number  since inception of' +he new 
system, Figures for the firs$ eight months of 2006 indicate a slight increase. 
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The evolution of the number of panel reports circulated displays a similar 
petkern, yet with a certain time lag and a peak in "h006. Overall, the number of 
panel repork is much lower than the number of consultation requests. This shows 
that mufually agreed solutions can be found in a considerable number of 
disputes prior to the circulation of the panel report (consultation or panel stage). 
Moreaver, in some cases, several separate consultation requests are dealt with by 
one single panel (e.g., in cases with multiple complainants), which equally 
contributes to the difference in numbers. The number of Appellate Body reports 
peaked in i 999, While every panel report circulated in 1996 and 1997 had 
been subject to an appeal, this ratio dropped to an average of around tvvo thirds 
for panel reports circulated after 2000. Overall, there have been relatively few 
complaints under Article 21.5 DSU regarding alleged non-compliance of 
defendants with panel rulings (so-called compliance reviews). The fairly small 
number is in stark contrast to the public perception of these "trade wars" as they 
concern "high profile1' cases, including EC - Bananas,' EC - Hormones16 and US - 
foreign Sales C ~ r ~ o r a t i o n s . ~  
Graph 3: Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System (1995-2005) 
kB Cornpld~nt\ 
il C~~,uldreif P,tnei liepon\ 
O C~rculaied Appellate BoJy Kepon\ 
E? Irr 21 5 Cofli 1'11ni\ 
+ K d i : ~  oi piinefrq~ofli that were later d p ~ e a k d  
Graph by the author; based on data from \vsr!dtradelaw.net (downloaded on 28 
February 2086) 
Notes: i , )  Numbers refer to standard DSki complaints. Hi.) Some of the panel 
reports circulated in 2005 inay still becolne the subject of an appeal later on. The 
low ratio of pane8 reports appealed in  2005 si~r~gild therefibre be ia~tcrpreted 
cautiously, 
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In terms of usage by country, the United States and the European 
Communities (EC) have been the DSU's most frequent users by far: Together, 
they account for nearly half of the cases brought before the W O  (see Graph 4). 
Among developing countries, Brazil and lndia are the most important users of 
the system. Developing countries' participation in dispute settlement proceedings 
is generally increasing, but still on a relatively modest level, given the high 
number of developing countries in the WO.  The near absence of LDCs in dispute 
settlement activities is another salient feature: The first LDC to lodge a complaint 
was Bangladesh. In early 2004, the country asked for consultations with lndia 
regarding Indian anti-dumping measures against battery imports from Bangladesh.' 
/ Graph 4: Main Users of the W O  Dispute Settlement System (1995-2005) 1 
H Complainant B Defendant I 
Graph by the author; based on data from worldtradelaw.net (downloaded on 28 
Februarqy 2086) 
/ Note: EC figures for cases where the EC is a respondent do nor include OS I 
numbers of complaints against individ 
Regarding the subject matter, by far most disputes concern trade in goods, 
with the GATT being the agreement whose provisions are most often invoked in 
disputes. This dominance sf goods trade in NTO dispute seNJement becomes 
even more appclreni when the c0mpil.sini.s relating to the special agreements in 
the goads sector (in particular those dealing with trade renaedies such as the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Counfst-vailiag Measures and t h e  Agreement W 
Antidurnping) are taken into account (see Graph 51, 
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By comparison, +he "new issues" - i.e., trade in services (GATS) and Trade- 
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) - have not yet been frequent subjects 
of W O  disputes. Nevertheless, it should be noted that one particularly "high 
profile" case - a dispute between the US and the EC on the one hand, and India 
on the other, regarding patent protection of pharmaceutical and agricultural 
chemical products - ranges among these  dispute^.^ Similarly, there have not 
been frequent disputes under the GATS. Some of these disputes, however, have 
considerable political and economic importance, i.e., a US complaint against 
Mexican measures affecting telecommunications10 and a complaint by the small 
Caribbean islands of Antigua and Barbuda against US measures affecting 
gambling services.l l 
Graph 5: Agreernet~ts whose Provisions were 
Subject to Litigation (1  995-2005) 
GATT I 
Anti-Dumping 7 
§CM 
Agriculture - 
Licensing m 
TBT 
Safeguards 
SPS m 
TRIPS = 
TRIMS h 
ATC m 
GATS F 
Customs Val. h 
GPA R 
llules of Origin ! 
l Number of Complaints l 
Graph by the author; based on data from worldtradetaw.net (downloaded on 28 
February 2006) 
Notes: GATT = General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; SCM = Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countenrailing Measures; AD = Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI of the GATT 5994 (Anti-Dumping); TBT = Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade; SPS = Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Pbytosanitargr Measures; TRIPS - Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
%ntellecteea% Property Rights; TRBMS = Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures; AT$: = Agreement on Textiles and Clotlsing; CATS -. General 
Agreement on Trade in Semices; GPA = Agreement on Government Procurement. 
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3.2 India's Use of the Dispute Settlement Procedure 
As has been noted above, lndia is among the most active developing country 
users of the WTO dispute settlement system. In chronological terms, the pattern 
displayed by India's activities in the system broadly follows the general pattern: 
Dispute activity was particu[arly strong in the first years after the new mechanism 
entered into force and then slowed somewhat (see Graph 6). Considered over a 
longer period of time, cases brought by lndia (16) and cases brought against 
lndia (l 7) are largely in balance. In certain years, however, there was a strong 
imbalance: For instance# after being a net complainant in 1995 and 1996, lndia 
faced seven challenges to her trade policy in 1997 alone, without lndia herself 
bringing one single case to Geneva in that year, Most of these cases, which were 
brought by a variety of Members, concerned India's quantitative restrictions on 
imports of agricultural, textile and industrial products. 
V? 
B 
E 
g 5 
C c ,  
b 
f I E 
1 
Cases agaimi 1ndia were brought by a variev of W8 Members, Disputes 
are fairly frequent betvdaen the European Communities and India, whereby lndia 
i s  more often on the bench than $he EC. With the United Shies as well, a fairly 
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intense dispute activity has developed. However, in the case of the US, India is 
more oPten a complainant than a defendant. Isolated disputes have been 
litigated with a number of other MTO Members (see Graph 7). 
CE 6 
8 5 
ill 
Connplainanh I Respadents in disputes with India 
O Disputes with India as Complainant iiBlI Disputes with India as Respondent 
1 Graph by the author;  based on data from worldtradelaw.net (downloaded on 28 1 February 2006) 
Dispi~te activity involving India has focussecl on trade in goods. As far as the 
GATT is  concerned, India has been both a complainant and a respondent. 
Cor?cerning anti-dumping, she has Far more ohen challenged foreign anfi- 
dumping measures than vice versa. Regarding Licensing and Agrick~Jturta, a 
different picture emerges: India has been more often a defendant than a 
complainant. Alihough the statistical data is too scarce to allow for sweeping 
generalisations, it points fa a raiiker restrictite cagricuitural frade policy and to the 
widespread use of licences in India, with adverse repercussions on the free flow 
of trade and, hence, on the cor3formiiy of 1;ldian trade policrec with rnulti/ater&al 
iri?de rules.'" 
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Other agreements have played a minor role in India's dispute activities. As 
one would expect in light of the structure of the Indian economy and her trade 
policies, she has pursued offensive trade interests under the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing, whereas she was a defendan4 under the TRIPS and TRIMS 
Agreements. Graph 8 gives an overview of the main agreements whose 
provisions were subject to litigation in disputes involving India. 
I Graph 8: Agreements whose Provisions were Subject to Litigation in / 
Cases Involving India (1 995-2005) 
- 
GATT 
AD 
Licensing 
Agriculture 
§CM 
TIJT 
SPS 
4 
'QC 
TRIMS 
TRIPS 
Rules of Origin 
Custom Val. 
N m k r  of Cases (DS N m k s s )  
m India as complainant m India as respondent 
P h y t o s a n i t a ~ ~  Measures; ATC = Agseemea~a on "8'extiles and Clothing; TRIMS = 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures; TRIPS --- Agreement on 
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As Graph 8 shows, India is  particularly active as a complainant against 
restrictions in the textiles sector. A minor portion of Indian complaints concerns 
primary products (agriculture and shrimp fishing), steel products, and 
pharmaceutical products (see Table 1). As a respondent, she was called upon to 
defend her policy measures in a variety of sectors including pharmaceuticals, 
agricultural and chemical products, textiles, automotive products and other. 
Quantitative restrictions and anti-dumping measures were among the most often 
challenged Indian trade policy measures (see Table 2 ) .  
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses 
Import Prohibition of Shrimp and 
GATT, Licensing, SPS, 
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contd.. . 
217 / U S  ft" 
Argentina 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy / AD, GATT, SCM, W O  
Offset Act of 2000 
Anti-Dumping Duties on Jute Bags AD, GATT, W O  
from India 
Measures Affecting the import of 
Pharmaceutical Products 
Rules of Origin for Textile and 
Apparel Products 
Conditions for the Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries 
Anti-Dumping Duties on Certain Flat 
Rolled Iron or Non-Alloy Steel 
Products from lndia 
Origin 
Enabling, GATT 
AD 
I Source: W O  Hontepage: Cl~ronological ists ofdisprrtes cases (http://www.wto.orgJ 1 
I Table 2: W '0 Disputes with India as Respondent (1995-2005) I 
Agreements DS Conlplainant l No. I 
Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Matter 
hemical Products 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Quantitative Restrictions on Agriculture, GATT; 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Licensing 
Industrial Products 
91 Australia Quantitative Restrictions on Agriculture, GATT; 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Licensing 
Industrial Products 
Quantitative Restrictions on Agriculture, GATT; 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Licensing 
industrial Products 
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Imports of Agricultural, Textile and 
Industrial Products 
Quantitative Restrictions on Agriculture, GATT; 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Licensing, SPS 
Industrial Products 
120 EC Measures Affecting Export of GATT 
Certain Commodities 
Measures Affecting Trade and GATT, TRIMS 
Investment in the Motor Vehicle 
Sector 
Import Restrictions under the / Agriculture, GATT, 
Export and Import Policy 2002- I licensing, SPS, TBT 
2007 
l 
of Certain Products from the 
European Communities and/or 
Customs Terrikoy of Taiwan, 
Penghaa, Mln~men and Matsu! 
I 
Measures Affecting Customs Duties 150 
I Source: SviO Homepage; Chronoiogicai lists ofdisputes cases (http://wu.w.rvto.org) I ! 
GATT EC 
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3.3 Perception in Scholarly Literature 
The WTO dispute settlement system has attracted a remarkable amount of 
academic attention. In this literature, the system received a particularly warm, if 
not enthusiastic, welcome. 
Specifically, the quasi-automaticity in the establishment of panels as well as in 
the adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports was among the most-lauded 
elements. This quasi-automaticity removed blockage possibilities for losing 
defendants that had existed in dispute settlement under the old GATT, The 
introduction of precise time-limits was equally seen as a highly positive step. 
From a legal point of view, the introduction of an appellate review mechanism 
and the institution of a permanent Appellate Body composed of highly-qualified 
lawyers were greeted as particularly important contributions towards improved 
legal quality of decisions and as a further step towards the rule of law in trade 
matters.13 More generally, this appellate review system was greeted as a model 
for other areas of international public law. 
HUDEC (1 999, pp. 4 and 9) has warned, however, not to overstate the 
differences between the new DSU and the former procedure under the GATT, 
With regard to the removal of blocking possibilities, HUDEC holds that blockage 
did not play too prominent a role in GATT practice either, as there was a 
community consensus that every Member should have a right to have its claims 
heard by an impartial third-party decision-maker. Moreover, GATT dispute 
settlement had already become a more iudicial instrument in the late 1970s and 
1980s, where the cornerstones were laid for the later evolution towards the DSU. 
As HUDEC (1 999, p. 11) argues with regard to the success of dispute settlement in 
the 1980s, an international legal system does not require rigctrously binding 
procedures to be generally effective but requisite political will can achieve much. 
As to this author, stringent procedures by themselves are not likely to make a 
legal system effective unless they are buttressed by sufficient political support. He 
cautioned, therefore, that even the new system would not lead to 100% 
compliance. As under the GAT, countries would be unable or unwilling to 
comply in specific cases under W O  dispute se;ttlemeni rules as well. The system 
would accordingly have to learn to live with legal failure. 
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Indeed, legal literature began to take these problems into account towards 
the end of the 19990s as imptemenbticn problems surged in a number of high 
profile cases; including, infer aiia, EC-Bananas, EC-Hormones, and US - Foreign 
Sales Corporafions. In these cases, the refusal of defendants to implement DSB 
recommendations triggered the suspension of concessions or other obligations 
(SCOO) by the complainant government under authorisation from the Dispute 
Settlement Body. More commonly known under martial terms like "retaliation" or 
"sanctions", the SCOO itself has become the focus of much fundamental 
criticism. Major problems, to name only a few, include its adverse economic 
effects, its inappropriateness from a small or developing country perspective, its 
psychological connotations and its negative impact on the predictability of trade 
conditions which the WTO is normally set "r preserve. 
Other problems identified with the new procedure include the often poor 
respect of the deadlines laid down in the DSU, the lack of a remand procedure 
which would allow the Appellate Body to remand certain issues back to the 
panels for further factual clarification, and the problems of developing countries 
wishing to participate more actively in the system. More recently, some quite 
strong criticism has been spelt out on the iurisprudence of the Appellate Body in 
trade remedy cases. The gist of this criticism is that the adjudicating bodies are 
exceeding their authority and are legislating instead of adjudicating, that they are 
not showing sufficient deference to Members' trade policy decisions, and that the 
system is biased towards trade liberoli~ation.'~ However, for the time being, 
strong criticism may be considered a minority view in literature. And, as some 
observers hold, "it is not always clear that some of the harshest critics of W O  
jurisprudence, many of whom have advocacy roles related to a variety of special 
interests, have the best interests of the overall WTO system in mind."15 
Yet, there is a real concern about what some commentators perceive to be an 
imbalance between relatively effective legal decision-making by the adjudicating 
bodies and ineffective political decision-making by the political bodies of the 
Unlike the iengthy search for compromise at the negotiating table, the 
quasi-automatic architecture of the BSU allows complainants to exact decisions 
on politically highly sensitive issues from the dispute settlement system, It is 
therefore hardly surprising that the DSU is the forum of choice for governments 
that perceive their position to be in accordance with W8 rules. The danger 
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associated with such a trend is that those Member governments that see thsir 
interests insufficiently safeguarded might be driven out of the system. This would 
be particularly problematic if large Members with "systemic weight" were to 
retreat from the system. There are two sirands in DSU literature that seek to strike 
a balance between the relative success and well-functioning of the dispute 
settlement system with its adjudicative bodies on the one hand, and the weakness 
of the consensus-based political decision-making at the W O  on the other. One 
school of thought - probably the minority point of view - seeks to re-strengthen 
political control of W O  dispute settlement and to weaken its adjudication 
~haracter. '~ Other authors, however, oppose any effort to weaken the 
adjudicating system and argue in favour of focussing reform efforts on improved 
political decision-making,'* 
4. Efforts to Review and Reform the DSU: The Negotiations 
and India's Contribution 
4.1 The DSU Review Negotiations 
The accumulated experience of W O  Members with dispute settlement under the 
DSU constitutes the foundation of the current negotiations to review and reform 
the DSU. This "DSU review" started already in 1997. However, it could not be 
concluded so far as several deadlines lapsed without tangible achievements. The 
last deadline missed so-far had been set for May 2004. As part of the so-called 
"July package" adopted on 1 August 2004, the mandate to continue the 
negotiations has been renewed, however, without a new deadline being set. This 
mandate was subsequently reconfirmed at the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the 
W O  in Hong Kong in December 2005. 
Despite their lack of success, the discussions are of interest as they track the 
evolution of country interests and negotiating positions in the dispute settlement 
system. Moreover, they point to opportunities perceived for improvements to the 
system and to the general degree of satisfaction with the system. The latter is of 
particular importance in a "member-driven organization". Whereas a full 
account of the negotiating process and of the many heterogeneous proposals 
submitted by Members wsuld be beyond the scope of this paper," a summary of 
tine stages of the negotiations process and of the major proposak received shall 
be given. 
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4.1.1 The Initial Stage of DSU Review Negotiations ( 1  997-1 999)" 
Negotiations in the early stages took place under a 1994 Ministerial Declaration 
and were supposed to conclude by the Third Ministerial Conference, i.e., by the 
Seattle meeting. Several Members participated actively in these largely informal 
negotiations (inter alia the European Communities, Canada, India, Guatemala, 
the United States, Venezuela, Hungary, Korea, Argentina, Japan) as a range of 
issues was discussed. The negotiations were mainly characterised by two divides - 
one ran between industrialised countries (mainly between the US and the EC) 
whereas the other pitted industrialised against developing countries. 
The rift between industrialised countries was mostly due to the efforts of the 
United States to strengthen the enforcement quality of the system. Being a "net 
complainant" in these initial years of DSU practice, and having won several 
"high profile" cases (such as EC - Hormones, €C - Bananas, Canada - 
Magazines, or lndia - Patents), the United States became increasingly worried 
that the implementation of the reports would remain behind their expectations. 
They therefore pressed forward with retaliatory measures and threats thereof, 
whereas the EC and Canada tried to delay the implementation of rulings. This 
translated into different proposals for the DSU review negotiations on the 
so-called sequencing issue which arose for the first time in €C - Bananas over 
ambiguities (or even contradictions, as some may argue) in Art. 21.5/22 DSU. 
The key question was whether a "compliance panel" must first review the 
implementation measures undertaken by a defendant before a complainant may 
seek authorisation to retaliate on grounds of the defendant's alleged non- 
compliance. Whereas the US initially opposed any idea of sequencing and 
favoured immediate retaliation, the EC and many other members argued in 
favour of the completion of such a compliance panel procedure as a prerequisite 
to seeking an authorisation to retaliate. The EC underlined its position, inter alia, 
by bringing a DSU case against US legislation requiring early retaliation2' and 
against its application22 in €C - Bananas, as well as by seeking an authoritative 
interpretation of the DSU in this respect.23 Both attempts ultimately failed. 
Andher d e m p t  by the US to increase the enforcement power of W O  dispuie 
sei"r1emerat occurred when it discussed the so-called "carousel retaliation"". This 
term refers to periodic mdifirations of the list of producis that are subject to the 
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suspension of concessions, and it surfaced for the first time when the "Carousel 
Retaliation Act of 1999" was introduced into Congress. Its purpose was to 
increase pressure on the EC Commission and European governments in €C - 
Bananas and €C - Hormones by requiring the government to periodically rotate 
the list of products subject to retaliation in order to maximise the effect of the 
sanctions. The measure was signed into law in May 2000, but has so far never 
been applied. Whereas the EC (supported by most other nations) sought a 
prohibition of carousel retaliation in the DSU review of 1998/1999, the US had 
sought a footnote explicitly allowing such retaliation. In a parallel development, 
the EC had requested consultations under the DSU on the carsusel provision in 
summer 2000, however, without proceeding to the panel stagesz4 
Finally, the US did not only pursue a "tough stance" on sequencing and on 
the carousel issue, but it also sought shorter timelines for certain steps in WTO 
dispute settlement. 
The controversy between developed and developing countries was of a 
different nature. It mainly focused on the issue of transparency and the 
acceptance of so-called "amicus curiae briefs", with the United States pressing 
hardest for both. Regarding transparency, the US wanted to make submissions of 
parties to panels and the Appellate Body public, and it wanted to allow public 
observance of panel and Appellate Body meetings. Developing countries in 
particular, but also some industrialised countries, opposed such increased 
transparency, as they feared "trials by media" and undue public pressure.25 
Insisting on the intergovernmental nature of the WTO, developing countries 
equally rejected efforts by the US and the EG to formalise the acceptance of 
amicus curiae, or "friend of the court", briefs. Amicus curiae briefs are unsolicited 
reports which a private person or entity submits to an adjudicative body in order 
to support (and possibly influence) its decision-making. These briefs became an 
issue for the first time in 1998 when the Appellate Body decided in US - 
Shrimp/Tvrtle26 that the panel had the authority to accept unsolicited arnr'cus 
curiae briefs. That right was subsequently confirmed in further disputes, causing 
outrage among many developing country Mernbers who feared undue 
interference from NGOs," 
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4.1.2 The "Limbo" in the DSU Review Negotiations (2000-2001)28 
After the December 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference had failed, the DSU 
review essentially remained in limbo through most of 2000 and 2001. Isolated 
efforts of Members to change the DSU failed. 
However, as DSU practice moved along, negotiating positions changed 
behind the scenes. New developments in the case US - Foreign Sales 
Corporations which the US had lost and where implementation measures were 
now disputed, weakened in particular the US position on issues such as carousel 
or sequencing: After it had become increasingly clear that the US replacement 
legislation (Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act; ET11 would not be in compliance 
with the DSB recommendations, the US and the €C negotiated in September 
2000 a bilateral procedural agreement on how to proceed in this case in order 
to bridge the gaps in the DSU on the sequencing issue. According to the 
Agreement, a sequencing approach was adopted under which a panel (subject 
to appeal) would review the W O  consistency of the replacement legislation, and 
arbitration on the appropriate level of sanctions would be conducted only if the 
replacement legislation was found WO-inconsistent. The US had now become a 
beneficiary of the sequencing approach (even with the possibility of subsequent 
appeal) which it had opposed before. It is believed that, in exchange for the 
agreement, the US had to back down on carousel retaliation although no such 
deal had been explicitly made part of the procedural agreement. The retaliatory 
measures requested by the EC were several times higher than US retaliation in 
EC - Bananas and EC - Hormones combined.29 The arbitrators later confirmed 
that the suspension of concessions in the form of 100% ad  valorem duties on 
imports worth 4.043 bn USD constituted "appropriate countermeasures". 
US - Foreign Safes Corporations was not the only case that had a weakening 
impact on the negotiating stance of the US: With more and more trade remedy 
cases - t.raditionally the Achilles heel of U% trade policy - being brought against 
the U% and the latter losing most of t h s e ,  the US stance changed from offensive 
into highly defensive, 
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As attempts to move the DSU review forward in 2000 and 2001 proved to be 
unsuccessful, the DSU review only returned to the fore at the Fourth Ministerial 
Conference in Doha in November 2001. The Daha Ministerial Declaration 
committed Members to negotiate o n  improvenlents to and clarifications of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
4.1.3 The Doha-Mandated DSU Review Negotiations (2002-2004 
According to the Doha mandate on the DSU Review, an agreement was to be 
reached no later than May 2003. Formal and informal discussions were held 
under the auspices of the Special Negotiating Session of the Dispute SetEIement 
Body, chaired by PETER BAL);s of Hungary. Work progressed from a general 
exchange of views to a discussion of conceptual proposals put forward by 
Members. In total, 42 specific proposals had been submitted by the deadline of 
the negotiations at the end of May 2003. The negotiations were comprehensive: 
Not only did they cover virtually all provisions of the DSU,31 but they also 
involved a large number of Members, including, inter aJia, all the "Quad" 
Members (with submissions being made by the EC, the US, Canada and Japan) 
as well as developing countries of all sizes and stages of development. As the 
papers were usually circulated as formal proposals (which means that the 
documents were released publiciy), this stage of the negotiations is relatively weli- 
documented. 
Compared to the pre-Seattle stage of DSU review negotiations, negotiating 
positions were, however, less clear-cut now. The most remarkable change 
occurred in the position of the United States, which reflected its new defensive 
stance in dispute settlement practice. In December 2002 the US submiHed, jointly 
with Chile, a proposal to strengthen flexibiiiv and member control in dispute 
~ettlement.~' The proposal would alfow the deletion of portions of panel or 
Appellate Body reports by agreement of the parties to a dispute, and an only' 
partial adoption of such reports. Moreover, it calls for "some form of additional 
guidance" to W O  adjudicative bodies. The gist of the submission is to transfer 
influence from the adiudicative bodies to the parties to disputes. The proposal 
was greeted predominantly with scepticism, wiih Members arguing that deleting 
parts of panei or Appellate Body reports would weaken the W O  cradJudieating 
bodies. Moreover, the move was seen as a contradisBian to earlier proposals on 
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improving transparency as parties would be able to "bury" more controversial or 
grot~ndbrecking decisions by the adjudicating bodies before the rulings were 
made public. The proposal was understood as attending to the complaints from 
Congress that the WTO adjudicating bodies were legislating. 
A large n~~rnber  of other proposals, only some of which can be presented 
here, were submitted. The EC reiterated calls for the establishment of a 
permanent panel body instead of the current system where panellists are 
appointed ad hoc, discharging their tasks on a part-time basis and in addition to 
their ordinary duties." Opponents of the proposal argue that a permanent panel 
body could be more "ideologicaltf and might engage in lawmaking. They 
therefore feel more comfortable with the current system which draws heavily on 
government officials who are familiar with the constraints faced by 
governments.34 
Developing countries submitted a variety of proposals with quite different 
orientations. For instance, some countries sought to strengthen enforcement by 
introducing collective r e t ~ l i a t i o n . ~ ~  It is meant to address the problems caused by 
the lack of retaliatory power of many small developing economies, such as those 
experienced by Ecuador in €C - Bananas. With collective retaliation, all WTO 
Members would be authorised (or even obliged under the concept of collective 
responsibility) to suspend concessions vis-6-vis a non-complying Member. 
Proposals for the retroactive calculation of the level of nullification and 
i v a i r m e n t  and for making the SCOO a negotiable instrument ( M e ~ i c o j , ~ ~  for 
introducing a fast-track panel procedure (Bra~il),~' and for calculating increased 
levels of nuilification or impairment (Ecuador)" have a similar thrust. At the same 
time, the African Group questioned the automaticity of the current dispute 
seHlement process and sought the re-introduction of more political elements.39 
China even proposed the intr~duction of a quantitative limitation on the number 
of complaints per year that countries could bring against a particular developing 
country."0 
By contrast fa these con"rroversi&rl proposals, a large number of less 
csntroversicri issues were integrated into a compromise text that was elaborated 
by Ambassador PS~~ER B A L ~ S  of Hungary. This so-colled BAGS text4' cgntains 
modifications +o all stages of the process, includirsg irnpi,aved notifica"iii=n 
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requirements for mutually agreed solutions, a procedure to overcome the 
U sequencing issue" in Art. 21 5/22 DSU, the introduction of an interim review 
into the appellate review stage, and a remand procedure in which an issue may 
be remanded to the original panel in case the Appellate Body is not able to fully 
address an issue due to a lack of factual information in the panel report. The 
compromise text would also have introduced numerous amendments in other 
areas, including, inter alia, housekeeping proposals, enhanced third party rights, 
enhanced compensation, and several provisions on the special and differential 
treatment of developing countries. 
Despite the existence of a compromise proposal, the deadline for the 
completion of talks that had been set for the end of May 2003 was finally 
missed. While many smaller trading nations would have favoured coming to a 
conclusion on a limited package of issues, both the EC and the US preferred 
negotiations to continue, and to address those (of their) concerns that had been 
left out in the B A ~ S  text. 
Members subsequently agreed to extend the deadline for the review by 
another year until the end of May 2004. However, the failure of the Fifth 
Ministerial Conference held in Canclin, Mexico, in mid-September 2003 caused 
a further setback to overall negotiations under the Doha mandate which also 
affected DSU review negotiations. Only a few additional proposals were brought 
into the negotiations between May 2003 and May 2004, including an informal 
paper by Mexico with an analysis of major issues in dispute settlement practice,42 
an informal proposal by Malaysia on provisional measures,43 a communication 
from Indonesia and Thailand with questions relating to the composition of 
panels,44 and a communication from Thailand on the workload of the Appellate 
Body.45 
The Chairman then established a brief report on his own responsibility to the 
Trade Negotiations Committee, He suggested continuing the negotiations, 
however, without any new target date.46 I, the subsequent decision adopted by 
the General Council on 1 August 2004 on the Doha Work Programme - the 
so-called ""duly Package" - the General Council took note of the above- 
mentioned repor$ and the continuation QC negsfiations according to the D s h a  
Mandate along the lines set out in the r"hoErmtrn% report was decide$.d' 
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4.1.4 Negotiations after July 2004 
Negotiations continued through the rest of 2004. Discussions focussed on 
stocktaking and on a proposal by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, India, New 
Zealand and Norway,48 dealing with issues such as sequencing, remand and 
post-retaliation, However, "not much was achieved", as the Chairman noted in 
his opening remarks at the first negotiating session on 18 January 2005.J9 
Unlike the discussions held in 2002 and 2003, the negotiations took place 
again in a more informal mode. A key characteristic of these informal 
discussions is a lack of public documentation: Neither the proposals (circulated 
as so-called "Jobs") are made public, nor are the informal portions of the 
discussions documented in the protocols (TN/DS/M/ document series). 
Presumably, this informal mode is meant to shelter the negotiators from public 
pressure and to facilitate a more open exploration of possible solutions without 
committing the Members to positions discussed during such talks. The 
preparation of the negotiating sessions was also intensified: Preparatory work 
was mostly done informally in groups of countries with similar interests such as 
the "Mexican Group" (also called "off-campus group"; an informal group open 
to participation from all delegations), the G-6 (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, India, 
New Zealand and Norway; initially including also Mexico as G-7), and the "like- 
minded" group (a group of developing countries, including India). 
Informal proposals were submitted by the "G-7" (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
India, Mexico, New Zealand and Norway; third party rights)50, the European 
Communities and Japan (on sequencing" and on post-retaliation"), the 
European Communities (panel composition)53 Korea (focussing on remand 
authority for the Appellate Body),54 and Australia (time- saving^).'^ Formal 
proposals at that stage were submitted by the United States (focussing on 
transparency5%nd on flexibility", including on additional guidance to WTO 
adjudicative bodiesia). Finally, a number of proposals focussing on special and 
differential treatment of developing countries were referred to the Special 
(Negotiating) Session of the Dispute Settlement Body by the Special Session of the 
Committee on Trade and Bevel~pment.~' 
In the Ministerial Declaration which resulted From the Sixth W O  Ministeriae 
Conference held in Wong Kong in December 20635, Members took ""note of the 
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progress made in the Dispute Settlement Understanding negotiations,. ." and 
directed "the Special Session to continue to work towards a rapid conclusion of 
the negotiations".60 
In 2006, work on the DSU review has continued on a largely informal basis.6' 
in Spring, informal proposals were circulated by the G-7 (revision of a proposal 
on third party rights),62 Canada (revised version of a (3-7 proposal on third party 
rights),63 Hong Kong (focussing on third party rights),64 Japan and the EC (joint 
proposal, focussing on "post-retaliation", i.e., the upward or downward 
adjustment of retaliation along with changes in the level of nullification or 
impairment),6i as well as by the G-6. Formal proposals on flexibilityd6 and on 
transparency6' were circulated by the US 
In Summer 2006, informal proposals were circulated by Japan68 and 
Swi t~er land,~~ each of which focussed on third party rights, as well as a proposal 
by Cuba, Malaysia and India, containing revisions to a previous formal 
prop~sal . '~  
Despite the suspension sine die of the Doha talks which occurred in late July 
2006, the DSU review talks appear to continue." 
4.2 India's Contribution to the DSU Review Discussions 
4.2.1 India's Participation in the Initial Stage of DSU Review Negotiations 
(1 997- 1 999) 
From early on, lndia has actively participated in the DSU review discussions. She 
submitted her first discussion paper in the DSU review period 1998/7 999, 
dealing with all stages and several horizontal issues of the dispute settlement 
process: 
Regarding consultations, lndia proposed to set a time-frame for the 
notification of mutually-agreed sol ~t ions. '~ 
With regard to the panel stage, India voiced her concerns about due process 
and equal opportunities to examine and rebut arguments and comment on 
documentarp. evidence. She therefore sought to give the con.lp1ainan.t and the 
defendant three to four weeks each, in sequential manner, for making +he first 
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and the second submissions to the panel.'3 In order to have clear terms of 
references for panels at an early stage, lndia suggested that the complaining 
party make all its claims in the first written submission, and that no claim should 
be entertained that had not been presented in the first written submi~sion.'~ 
Drawing on her experience in the India-Patents Case, where first the US and later 
the EC requested a panel on basically the same issue, lndia suggested that rules 
for multiple complainants under Art. 9 and 10 of the DSU need to be adapted: 
She held that "an unmitigated right to bring successive complaints by different 
parties based on the same facts and legal claims would entail serious risks for 
the multilateral trade order, besides imposing an (sic!) unnecessary resource 
costs of re-litigation of the same m~t te r . " '~  Moreover, lndia sought to ensure that 
matters already undergoing the panel process may only be referred to the 
original panel before the first written submissions have been made by the parties 
to the original d i~pute. '~  Finally, lndia proposed to amend Art. 16.4 DSU on the 
adoption of panel reports so as to provide 60 days after circulation of panel 
reports to Members before they are considered in the DSB." 
On appellate review, lndia proposed to increase the period of time between 
the circulation of Appellate Body reports to Members and their consideration in 
the DSB to 30 days." lndia also called for improved transparency with regard to 
the constitution of Appellate Body divisions.79 lndia further proposed to extend 
the time-frame for appellate review from 60 to 90 days.80 
Implementation: With regard to implementation, lndia called for a solution to 
the problem of an uneven distribution of retaliatory power between developing 
countries on one hand and developed countries on the other. Specifically, lndia 
suggested limiting the right of developed countrids to retaliate against developing 
countries to countermeasures under the same agreements in which a violation 
may have occurred, while allowing developing countries to get relief through 
joint retaliation by the entire membership of the W O  against the wrongful 
defendant." 
The Indian proposal also dealt extensively with the provision on special and 
differentiai treatment of developing lndia deplores the general 
character atad lack of specificiiy in many S&D 3 s  there was no way 
to ensure tisahsuch special and  diflere~tiat irecatment would be accorded to 
W O  Dispute Settlement: General Appreciation and the Role of India 175 
developing countries in practice, lndia suggested replacement of the word 
"should" by "shall" in such provisions, as well as specific guidelines to ensure 
rigorous implementati~n.'~ lndia further proposed to differentiate between 
developing and developed countries when it comes to implementation: For 
disputes involving developed and developing countries, lndia wishes to increase 
the maximum time period for implementation from 15 months to 30 months in 
the case of developing country  defendant^.'^ Moreover, lndia sought to give 
developing countries additional time to implement the commitment "(i)f, due to 
circumstances beyond the control of a developing country and in spite of such 
country's best endeavour, the developing country is unable to complete action 
within the implementation period By contrast, lndia proposed a 30 day 
time-frame for the compliance panel procedures in cases against developed 
countries "without any further procedural requirement."" Regarding time-frames, 
lndia also called for longer time-frames for developing country defendants to 
prepare their submissions, rebuttals etc.88 
In her paper, lndia also expressed her frustration over "certain developed 
countries" that use dispute settlement proceedings "to prove their aggression to 
domestic constituencies." According to India, "(p)rocedures must be developed to 
make sure that the interests of developing countries are protected and that 
developed countries do not use dispute settlement proceedings as instruments for 
coercion of the less privileged Member countries." This would translate into a 
concrete suggestion that developed country Members abstain from invoking the 
DSU if the trade effect of a developing country measure on the developed 
country is only marginal, i.e., below a certain de-minimis level. Alternatively, 
panels should first look into this aspect and dismiss the case if it is found that the 
trade effect does not exceed this de-minimis limit. 
In her proposal, lndia also highlights the problem of the enormous legal cost 
associated with participation in W O  dispute settlement. in order to alleviate the 
burden on developing countries, lndia suggests that some kind of levy may be 
imposed on a country using the dispute settlement mechanism. The amount 
collected would, along with supplementay W O  funds, be used to assist 
developing countries. Moreover, developed countries should bear "re legal costs 
W O  AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
incurred by developing countries in cases challenging developed country 
measures that are later found to be illegal. Finally, lndia calls for increased 
capacity-building efforts to the benefit of developing c~untries.~' 
lndia remarks in her proposal that dispute settlement with regard to anti- 
dumping cases had a different standard of review than dispute settlement in 
other areas. Given the special conditions and circumstances of developing 
countries, lndia sought to remove this anomaly by either subjecting the Anti- 
Dumping Agreement to the same standard of review as other covered 
agreements or, alternatively, to apply the standard of review currently used in the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement to the 
4.2.2 India's Role in the "Limbo" in the DSU Review Negotiations (2000- 
2001) 
After it became clear in mid-1999 that the DSU review could not be concluded 
within a deadline that had been set to July 1999, lndia and some other countries 
opposed any continuation of the review after the 1999 summer break." lndia 
was not particularly supportive of continuing the DSU review at the Seattle 
Ministerial either, taking an intermediate position along with Indonesia, between 
countries that expressed outright opposition against a continuation of talks (such 
as Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines and Egypt) and countries that favoured the 
continuation thereof (the US in particular, but also many other WTO Members 
such as the EC, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Australia and others). As noted above in 
Section 4.1 -2 ,  the DSU review remained essentially in limbo in 2000-2001, with 
no major contribution by lndia being noted. 
4.2.3 India's Contribution to The Doha-Mandated DSU Review 
Negotiations (2002-2004) 
In the 2002-2003 negotiations under the Doha mandate, lndia took once more 
an active role. She engaged early on in the discussions, submitting a large 
number of questions on a paper which had been submitted by the EU (the first 
paper at all under the Doha-mandated negotiations). 
Later on, lndia brought in proposals jointly with other developing countries. 
Some of 'rhe proposals are familiar from the paper submi~ed by lndia previously 
(see above Section 4.2.1). These include improved notification requirements for 
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mutually a g r e e d  solutions, the  strengthening of developing countries when it 
c o m e s  to  making use of countermeasures,  a n d  the  problem of litigation costs. 
The  contents of all the  formal proposals (CO-)sponsored by lndia during the 
2002-2003 negotiations a r e  summarised  in Table 3. 
Table 3: Synopsis of the Proposals (co-)sponsored by 
lndia in the 2002-2003 Negotiations 
/ DOC. Sponsors l 
1 No. 1 1 
Concrete Proposals 
TNDSI 
w/7 
TNID S1 
W/18 
and 
TNIDSI 
W/181A 
dd. l 
l 
1 
l 
TNIDSI 
iW15 
I EC 
+ Cuba, 
Honduras, 
India, 
Jamaica, 
Malaysia, 
Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, 
Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe 
i 
l 
zicuba, Honduras, - 
India, 
,Indonesia, 1 ~ a l a y s i a ,  
1 Pakistan, 
l ~ r i  Lanka. 
!Tanzania, 
l i Zim ba bwe 
l 
more attractive), on transparency, and on  amicus curiae 
submissions (answers in TNIDSN7). I 
India 
The EU's answers t o  India's questions, as  contained in 
TNDSnN15. I 
39 questions on the  EC Proposal a s  contained in TN/DS/W/I,I 
covering the  proposals for a permanent panel body, on 
implementation issues (in particular making compensation 
Proposal, consisting of (I) An introduction, and calling for (11) ~ n (  
obligation t o  notify within 60 days the  te rms of  settlement of l mutually agreed solutions; ( I l l )  Clarification that  the  te rm,  
IUseek" (right t o  seek information) shall be limited to1 
information sought actively by the  panels and the  AB, and that1 
unsolicited information (amicus curiae briefs) shall not  be  taken' 
into consideration; (IV) New terms of appointment for AB 
members, consisting of non-renewable six-year terms; (V) Prompt 
distribution t o  disputing parties of  inputs provided by the  
Secretariat; @'I) Establishment of guidelines on the  nature of 
the  notice of appeal in order t o  make sure such notices are 
sufficiently clear (Working Procedures for Appellate Review, 
WT/AB/WP/4); (Vll) Preservation and expansion of third party 
/rights during the  appeal. 
Conceptual and textual proposal calling for (I) The freedom of 
developing countries t o  suspend concessions vis-8-vis non- 
complying industrial countries in sectors of their choice; 
(11) Awarding litigation costs in cases involving developing! 
countries and industrial countries t o  the  industrial country if itj 
does  not  prevail in the  dispute; (111) Further S&D provisions,' 
/regarding consultations, time-frames, and implementation. I l 
l l 
l 
i 
l 1 
contd., . 
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India, i~extual proposal, strengthening the notification requirement of1 
Cuba, mutually acceptable solutions (Art. 3.6), factually prohibiting! 
Dominican /panels to accept unsollicited information (footnote to Art. 13),1 
Republic, appointing Appellate Body members on a non-renewable six/ 
E ~ Y  pt, lyear term (An. 17.2), giving third parties a right to be heard by 
Honduras, t he  Appellate Body (Art. 17.4); establishing minimum 
Jamaica, !requirements for notices of appeal (footnote to Art. 17.6);i 
Malaysia denying the Appellate Body the right to seek or accept l iinformation from anyone other than parties or third parties 
j(footnote to Art. 17.6); expanding freedom for developing 
/countries regarding sectors subject to retaliation (Art. 22.3bis); 
/awarding litigation costs to developing countries of 500'000 
USD or actual expenses, whichever is higher (Art. 3bis); 
strengthening the S&D provisions in Art. 4.10, Art, 2 2.10, Art. 
121.2. 
In addition to the afore-mentioned formal proposals, lndia submitted a non- 
paper jointly with Argentina, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand and Norway in mid- 
May 2004, shortly before the lapse of the May 2004 deadline. This document 
contained textual proposals on a selection of issues, i.e., sequencing, remand, 
and procedures for the removal of the authorisation to suspend concessions or 
other obligations.92 
4.2.4 India's Contribution to Negotiations after July 2004 
In the months after the lapse of the May 2004 deadline, the afore-mentioned 
informal paper submitted by lndia and some co-sponsors93 remained on the 
agenda of the DSB special negotiating ses~ion.'~ in January 2005, lndia 
submitted - jointly with Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand and 
Norway - another paper on the DSU review with a textual proposal on third 
party rights.95 A revised version of the same paper was presented in Spring 
2006.~' 
In Summer 2006, lndia submitted - jointly with Cuba and Malaysia - an 
informal paper containing revisions to a previously submitted text,97 foeussing on 
developing country issues such os special and dieeren"ra1 treatment 'of 
developing countries, freedsm of cross-retaliation for developing countries, a 
narrow interpretation of the right to "'seeki9 information as contained in Art. 13 
D S U . ~ ~  
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In addition to advancing proposals of her own and jointly with others, lndia 
increasingly participated in coordination efforts between the different informal 
groups.99 
4.2.5 Analysis: lndia in the DSU Review 
lndia participated actively in most stages of the DSU review, with the exception of 
the 2000-2001 period when negotiations were in a general limbo. In the BSlJ 
review negotiations, lndia focussed clearly on developing country interests, in 
particular with a view to strengthening special and differential treatment of 
developing countries. Some of the proposals lndia brought were clearly 
motivated by her own experience with the mechanism. 
In the (mostly informal) negotiations that have taken place since 2005, lndia 
actively participated in several informal groups, also trying to build bridges 
between proposals that were elaborated inside these different groups. In this 
context as well, a major focus of India's efforts lay in the special and differential 
treatment of developing countries. Not surprisingly, the major allies of lndia in 
these negotiations were other developing countries such as China, Nigeria and 
Malaysia. 
4.3 The Difficulties of Concluding the DSU Review 
The difficulties faced by negotiators so far in their attempts to reach a successful 
conclusion of the DSU review negotiations may be explained with a number of 
reasons: Firstly, the consensus requirement'00 for any change to the DSU sets 
high hurdles, particularly as the W O  counts 149 heterogeneous Members with 
equally heterogeneous interests. These problems are further exacerbated in the 
case of the DSU review where negotiators are intending to reap an early harvest 
outside the larger context of the Doha negotiations and thus within a narrow field 
of negotiations, offering less space for compromise solution through the linkage 
of different issues and interests. 
Secondly, key decisions of the adjudicative bodies and Members' experience 
with the system have created cosltroversial views on specific aspects of the system 
that have become increasingly difs"icult to bridge (e.g., on issues such as 
transparency, amicus curiae briefs) carousel retaliaiisn or collective retaliation - 
iN7'8 AND DtSPUTE RESOLUTION 
to mention but a few). Thirdly, and of fundamental importance, there appears to 
be a more profound ccrratrsversy regarding the overctll direction the BSU should 
pursue, namely whether it should continue ifs route towards more rule- 
orientation and adjudication, or whether it should return to a more negotiatory 
and diplomatic - i.e., power-oriented - approach.'0' Proposals with both 
orientations have been submitted, as the non-exhaustive list of examples in Table 4 
show. 
/ Table 4: Power-Orientation versus Rule-Orientation in the Doha Round l I DSU Negotiations I 
I requirements for mutually I consi~ltations/parie! requests; I 
acceptable solutions and written 
reports on the outcome of 
consultations; 
5 Connpliance reviews of ~nutually 
agreed solutions; 
Calls for separate opinions by 
individual panellists/Appellate 
Body Members; 
e Flexibility during appellate review: 
interim review and the suspension 
1 . Reduced time frames; ! of the appellate procedures; I 
c Ci-eation of a professional 
Permanent Panel Body (PPB); 
Terrns of appointment of the 
Appellate Body; 
Regulating sequencing and 
implementation; 
a Prohibition sf  carousel retaliation; / a Strengthening ellforcement and 
the cost of non-compliance; 
s Strengthening third party rights; 
Deletion of findings from reports; 
6 Partial adoption procedures; 
Additional measures of special and 
differential treatment of 
developing cot~ntries; 
Extension of time-frames by 
agreement of the parties; 
ObIiging adjudicating bodies to 
submit certain issues to the 
General Council for iriterpretation. 
Increasing external transparency. 
l 
For more details, see ZI,WICIER&I~~NI\I (20061, pp. 204-2 14. 
Fourthly, some problems of the DSU review may be explained with the 
diSeiculties of negotiating reforms to a system that is constantly in use: 
Negotiating pasifions are subject Do permanent change as Members conainususly 
gather new experience due to new cases and new reports. Moreover, on-going 
negotiations on material WTO rules may also have a bearing on the stance of 
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Members towards the dispute se~lernent sy?;tem (e,g., the negoiications on 
"Rvles", including on anti-dumping). Such problems can be paitly remedied by 
the inclusion of generous periods of transition for any change to the BSU. 
Finally, despite the criticism that Is occasionally voiced, there seems to be a 
general sense of satisfaction with the system. As the CONSULTAT~VE BOARD (2004, 
p. 56) holds with regard to the lack of success of the DSU review to date, "... an 
important underlying concern is, or should be, to not A o  any harm' to the 
existing system since it has so many valuable attributes." 
4.4 The "DSU Review in Practice" 
As negotiations on the DSU Review are stalled, practical solutions have been 
found to some of the problems in what could be called a "DSU reform in 
practice". It includes practical actions both by Members and by the adjudicating 
bodies to further develop the system and to come to terms with the problems in 
its application, as the following examples show. 
Firstly, the sequencing problem has been overcome by the conclusion of 
bilateral agreements between the Members during the implementation stage. 
These agreements allow Members to .overcome the gaps and contradictions in 
the DSU text in a practical way. Whereas, there has not yet been a consensus to 
adapt the DSU text to this evolving practice, Members have adapted to the 
practice of bilateral agreements and do no longer appear to consider the 
sequencing issue as a pressing concern. 
Secondly, a partial solution could be found to the differences of opinion with 
regard to external transparency: In two recent cases,'02 the panels opened to the 
public their proceedings with the main parties to the dispute, as the latter had 
jointly requested. At the same time, the proceedings with third parties remained 
closed, as not all third parties had agreed to such an opening of the process. 
Thirdly, with regard to amicus curiae briefs, the Appellate Body has de facfo 
developed a very pragmatic approach, despite initially strong opposition from 
mostly dE3'veloping countries. On the one hand, the Appellate Body displays cx 
general openness towards the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs. On the other 
hand, i B  does not appear to accord decisive weight io these submissions in its 
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decisions - at least not explicitly. This approach gives adjudicating bodies a 
maximum of flexibility while it respects the concerns of Members who are against 
such briefs. 
Fourthly, on a related matter, the Appellate Body has found a response to the 
concerns of many Members who held that the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs 
gave NGOs an edge over Members, as the latter had to cope with restrictive 
requirements on third country participation. It relaxed these requirements by 
adopting new working procedures in late 2002 which give third parties the 
possibility of attending oral hearings even if they had not made a written 
submission prior to the hearing, as the old rule had required.'03 Similarly, the 
Appellate Body only recently adopted new working procedures requiring more 
precision in notices of appeal. It thus catered for a long standing concern of 
some Members who had called for increased precision of notices of appeal but 
were unable to reach such a modification through the DSU review negotiations.'04 
As a final example, the establishment of an Advisory Centre on World Trade 
Law (ACWL) has remedied some of the resource constraints that developing 
countries face in the, more sophisticated legal settings of the new dispute 
settlement system. This international organisation, which is independent from the 
WO,  provides legal training, support and advice on WTO Law and dispute 
settlement procedures to developing countries, in particular LDCs. ACWL services 
are available against payment of modest fees for legal services varying with the 
share of world trade and GNP per capita of user governments.lo5 The Centre 
thus serves to a certain degree as a substitute for other institutions such as, for 
instance, a special fund for developing countries - a proposal that has been 
brought into the DSU review negotiations by developing countries. 
As these examples show, Members and adjudicating bodies manage to adapt 
the dispute settlement system to changing circumstances without changing one 
single provision of the BSU. Dispute settlement pracfice has thus brought some 
amount of DSU reform, without facing the problems of political renegotiations of 
the DSU text In other terms, the system seems to build once more on its historic 
strength, which is to evolve with C! certain degree of flexibility and in a pragmatic 
spirit. We should not be surprised ifi as in the past, these elements of evolving 
practice were to be codified into a new or modified text a"s later date, 
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Conclusions 
The first eleven years of dispute settlement practice under the DSU have 
confirmed the usefulness of the system: Except for a recent slowdown (which 
cannot be property interpreted yet), the mechanism has been used actively, and 
the perception by both practitioners and academic observers has generally been 
positive. 
Nevertheless, the intense use of the mechanism has also revealed certain 
problems in its practical application. Guided by their own experiences and 
interests, Members have sought to improve the mechanism through several 
rounds of DSU review negotiations since late 1997. So far, all these attempts 
have been unsuccessful. While negotiations are currently continuing, there is no 
clear deadline and, subsequently, there is a presumption that the impetus for the 
conclusion of the negotiations may not be sufficient to lead to a conclusion in the 
near future.. In the meantime, Members and adiudicating bodies have managed 
to resolve some of the practical issues through a further development of dispute 
settlement practice without amending the DSU text. 
As far as lndia is concerned, she has made active use of the system. Most of 
her litigation took place with major trade partners such as the United States and 
the European Union. The sectoral pattern of India's dispute activity follows her 
trade structure and her trade policy profile: As a complainant, she focussed her 
efforts on challenging foreign trade restrictions in the textile sector and on 
foreign anti-dumping practices. As a defendant, lndia had to face complaints 
against her quantitative restrictions, her patent policies, and more recently, her 
anti-dumping practices. In tune with her active use of the system, lndia also 
engaged actively from early on in the DSU review discussions. As could be 
expected, India's negotiating positions mainly ,reflect her interests as a 
developing country, 
Regarding the general outlook for the DSU, the maior challenge for the 
system is  not so much whether the multitude of technical questions in the DSU 
review negotiations can be resolved through an agreement but, rather, how well 
suited the DSU is to overcome the more fundamental concern - notably that 
there is an kinsustainable imbalance between political and iudicial decision- 
making in the W O .  This holds in particular after the suspension sine die of the 
{VTO ,AND DISPUTE RESOLCTHON 
Dokltn RoIJ;~:,~ 3f inuiiilatercl trade negotiations: In tile current coniexi of blocked 
psliiicai negotiations, pressures !Q resolve poiiiiculiy delicate issues through use 
of the dispute sevkerrten-i- mechar2ism might increase even further. 
None of the ;WO generic options that are being discussed to remedy the 
situation -- weaken'ng adjudication or strengthening political decision-making - 
lioids great prorrlise if considered in isolation. Weakening adjudication is not an 
anractive option as t%\ervmbers would have to forego the achievements which the 
new DSU has brought For a rules-based international trading system. It would 
also be at odds with globcliisution and i ts increasing reliance on internaiional 
transactions in economic life. Aikrnatively, improving political decision-making is 
an exfrernely difiicuit task and could resuli in imporkarat bAembers being driven 
out of the system, if the sacred consensus principle were to be replaced by sorne 
form of majority voting. Sovereignty concerns similar io those that are currently 
voiced against allegedly overreaching dispute settlement would ultimately be 
raised against undesired outcomes of voting procedures as they would eventually 
force results upon countries which the latter cannot or do not want to accept. 
For the time being, onty incremental steps by a variety of actors therefore 
seem to be feasible and desirable t~ remedy khe situation: 
* All Members should assume .their systemic responsibil i~ by exercising 
restraint in bringing pofitically diFFicult eases to adjudication. 
(P Adiudicating bodies should continue their current approach to dispute 
settlement, based on iudiciat restraint and the avoidance of "sweeping 
slaterrrents". 
* Selective multilateral political elements could be built into the dispute 
senlement procedure without alkring the basic architecture of the DSU 
(e.g., by irilowing the DSB to decide by consensus not to adopt specific 
findings or the basic rationare behind a finding in a report.) 
o dternbers should explore alkernative poiitical decision-making mech~lrntsms 
rnore actively, indeed, the W O  Cammuniv has become aware of the 
prob1ei-n as the report t3y the ""Consultative Group" croiind PETER 
S U T E ~ E W ~ \ N C )  to the Director General showed. Tkie reportlbsas a clear focus 
213 ii?sti!u:ior?~l Issues! including tail decision-making."" 
Whereas such a gradual and eclectic appraack~ may not satisfy the more 
ambitious observers who VJC?U!CI favour clear reforms in either direction - i.e., 
towards more adjudication and rule-orientation or back to po~er-orieniaiion and 
diplomacy - this ecieeiicisi-i appears at !east as a feasible option. And, if judged 
in the light of past experience viiil; the gradual evoiutiorl of the system, it also 
appears to be the most promising approach: The current DSU is the fruit o i  five 
decades of gradual develi>pmeni, which has no+ been free of setbacks. There is 
no reason to assume why this gradualism should not be adequate for the future 
as well. if Members and adiudicating bodies continue is assume their systemic 
responsibility, the DSU should continue to remain an aMractive forum for dispute 
se.l?fement. 
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JobjO4)/2, discussed in TMiDS/M/15. 
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See TN/DS/W/79, discussed in TN/DS/M/27. 
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59 So-called "Category 11" special and differential treatment provisions, compiled in 
.Job(05)/258; see the discussion in TN/DS/M/29, including on further references. 
60 See WT/MIN(OS)/DEC of 18 December 2005, Paragraph No. 34. 
41 See the reports by the Chairman of the negotiations to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee TNC (TN/DS/14 through TN/DS/17). The work programme of 2006 was 
discussed by Members on 22 February 2006 after confirmation of the new chairman 
of the negotiations, Ronald Saborio Soto from Costa Rica (see TN/DS/M/30. 
6 2  Job (05)/19/Rev. l ; discussed in TN/DS/M/3 1 , 
63 J~b(06)/56, based on previous work contained in TM/DS/W/41 with a focus can 
procedures for the handling of confidential inbarnation, discussed in -hM/DS/M/3 1. 
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Job(05)/47/Add. l ,  based on previous proposal Job(05)/4T. 
TN/DS/W/82/Add.2; discussed in TN/DS/M/31. 
The formal proposal was circulated previously as TN/DS/W/47. See also below in 
Section 4.2.3. 
See the latest report by the Chairman of the negotiations to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee TNC of 1 September 2006 (TN/DS/18). 
See Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
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See Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
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See Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
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See Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
(undated), No. 5. 
See Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
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See Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
(undated), No. 8. 
See Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
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See Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
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See Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by India 
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See Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
(undated), No. 1 1. 
See Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by India 
(undated). 
Ad. 4.10, Ad. 8.10, Ad, 32.1 9 ,  Ad. 21.2, 21.9 and 21.8, Ad* 24 and Ad. 27.9 and 
27.9 DSU are quoted as examples, 
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See Review of the Dispuie SeBtlemenB Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
(undated), No, 1, lit, a. 
See Review of the Dispute Senlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
(undated), No. 1, lit. b, (i). 
See Review of the Dispute Senlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
(undated), No. 1, lit. e. 
See Review of the EIepute Senfernent Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
(undafed), No. 1 : lit. b, ( i l l .  
See Review of the Dispuie Senlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
(undated), No. 1, lit. c. 
See Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
(undated), No. 13.  
See Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding - Discussion Paper by lndia 
(undated), No. 12. 
See "WTO Fails to Meet Deadline For Completing DSU Review"; in: international 
Trade Reporter, Vol. 16, No. 31, 4 August 1999; and "WO Members Deadlocked 
on DSU Review After Missing July Deadline"; in: lnside US Trade, 6 Augcst 1989. 
93 Job(04)/52. 
94 See TNIDS/W70, TN/DS/W/71, and TNIDSNI72. 
95 See Job(OS)/l9. 
97 TM/DS/\kIi47. 
98 Being an informal proposal, this document is not officially crvaiiable. A discussion is 
included in the minutes of the meeting on I3 July 2006 (TNIDSIPAf34). 
9 " 4 f ~ e ,  for instance, the discussion in TNiDS/M/32, Nos. 1 7 -1 3. 
100 See Article X.8 of the bVT0 Agreement. 
I Q 1  For the purpose of this ndicle, rule-orientation is understood as the heavy reliance 
on procedural and material rules for the ese~lement of trade disputes. In such a 
seHing, relatively much power and independence are granted to adjudicadiive bodies, 
and the results of the adibdicafive process ore cot subject ie, political review, By 
contrast, ~egotiations and pslitica1 power play a stronger foie for She outcome in a 
power-oriented dispute se~Iernen.2 procedure. in such a setting, disputing parties 
enjoy 3 large amount  of csntrsi and f i e x i b i l i ~  whereas less power is granted to 
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adiudication bodies. Rule-orientation and power-orientation as basic concepts for 
the senlement of international trade disputes were introduced into the literafirre by 
JACKSON ( 7  978).  For cr shod overview, see JACKSON ( 7  9971, pp. 1096C. For a critical 
comment, see DUNNE I I I  (2002). 
1 Q2 United States - Continued Suspension sf Obligations in the E@ - Hormones Dispufe 
fbTlDS320) and Canada - Continued Suspension of Ob/ifiaiions in the EC - 
Hormones Dispute (VbTiDS32 1 ). 
103 These modifications were introduced into document W/AB/WP/7 (meanv~hile 
replaced by W/ABPJP/8j. See also " W O  Appellaie Body Braces for Criticism For 
Easing Rules on Third Party Participation"; in: WTO Reporter, 10 October 2002; 
" W O  Appellate Body Chair Offers To Discuss Appellate Review Rules"; in WPO 
Reporter, 23 October 2002; and "Appellate Body to Clarify Working Procedures on 
Role of Third Parties"; in: Inside US Trade, 15 November 2002. 
104 W/AB,'WP/8. The new procedures entered into force on 1 January 2085. 
105 For more information on the ACWL, see h~p://ww.acwl.ch - in pudicular 
http://www.acwl.ch/elquic kguide 
l 0 6  See CONSULTATIVE BOARD (2004). 

